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A B S T R A C T   
The recast of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II) provides an enabling framework for “Renewable Energy 
Communities” (RECs) that is being transposed into law by the 27 European Union Member States by June 2021. 
RECs are majority owned by local members or shareholders who are authorized to share energy within the 
community, offering the potential to unlock private investment and financing for renewable energy sources and 
provide social benefits. However, successful implementation and a just energy transition requires the coupling of 
technological solutions with more open decision making, based on sound analysis, knowledge of engineering, 
spatial planning, and social science. We argue that financing and ownership models that address renewable 
energy complementarity, spatial organization of resource potential, demographics, pushback from incumbents, 
and inclusion of traditionally marginalized groups, are common issues across all Member States that are crucial 
for the transposition of RED II and a just energy transition. This paper highlights the benefits and challenges of 
widespread development of RECs, and using examples from the pending transposition process provides policy 
advice for effective implementation of the RED II with respect to RECs.   
1. Introduction 
Renewable energies (RE) must achieve at least 63% share of the 
energy system by 2040 to meet both the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, and Paris Agreement targets (United Nations, 2017). 
Within the electricity system, moving past the current technical 
observed maximum 20–40% RE (Martinot, 2016) on the grid requires 1) 
a new energy system logic and architecture, and 2) measures to increase 
social acceptance of system changes across widespread geographies and 
different types of stakeholders (Seidl et al., 2019). This article discusses 
the consequences for the Energy Union of the EU relaunch of the Eu-
ropean Clean Energy Package for all Europeans (CEP) (European Com-
mission and Directorate-General for Energy, 2019). The recast of the 
Renewable Energy Directive - RED II (European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, 2018) as part of the CEP was passed in 2018/19 
at the EU level. Its rules are embedded in those of the 2019 Internal 
Electricity Market Directive (IEMD) and Regulation (IEMR) (Jasiak, 
2018). Product of a decade long learning process, the updated directive 
establishes several new binding targets for the EU for 2030 (Solorio and 
Jörgens, 2020), such as at least 32% of EU’s gross final energy con-
sumption sourced from RE, at least 14% of transportation fuel from 
renewable sources by 2030, and an increase by 1.3% annually of the 
share of RE in the energy supplied for heating and cooling. The RED II, in 
addition to the CEP’s provisions on common rules for the internal 
market for electricity, energy efficiency, governance, buildings’ per-
formance and risk preparedness, is a key instrument for achieving the 
EU’s 2030 and 2050 climate targets, updating its energy policy. It also 
introduces policy frameworks for new and existing market and system 
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actors that facilitate the further deployment of RE and encourage the 
necessary private and public investments based on market signals. 
If effectively implemented and transposed into national law, the RED 
II has the potential to accelerate a more just and sustainable energy 
transition by facilitating the widespread implementation of “Renewable 
Energy Communities” (RECs). Under the RED II, RECs are majority 
owned by local members or shareholders, entitled to produce, store and/ 
or distribute energy, supported by an “enabling framework” (detailed in 
Section 2), and authorized to share energy within the community. They 
are part of the rapidly evolving sector of locally-focused distributed 
energy ownership often referred to as “community energy”. The sector is 
diverse with various interpretations of what a “community” is, how 
decision-making power is distributed, who receives project benefits (i.e. 
in the form of direct electricity benefits, financial returns), and the 
motivations for the project (Hicks and Ison, 2018). In general, to be 
defined as community energy, initiatives have some form of inclusive, 
participatory decision-making, a “local” focus, and motivations for 
operation that go beyond profit maximisation, all criteria that were also 
included in the RED II. These criteria are intended to spur rapid societal 
transitions to a new energy system by encouraging public uptake of, and 
support for, sustainable energy by broader publics in a way that avoids a 
reconcentration of political power and wealth in the hands of a small 
number of energy companies. Community energy is a fundamental de-
parture from the centralised, profit maximisation-focused model of 
electricity generation and distribution that exists in most advanced 
economies (Burke and Stephens, 2018). 
As countries transpose the RED II into national law, there is signifi-
cant value in considering the benefits that substantial support of RECs 
can provide. Research has shown that community energy has the po-
tential to unlock private investment and financing for RE (de Brauwer 
and Cohen, 2020), provide social benefits (Burke and Stephens, 2018), 
and maximize efficient use of the grid (Koirala et al., 2016). It can in-
crease public acceptance and installation rates of RE, while creating 
diversified revenue streams and green jobs (Hoch et al., 2019). By 
enabling community participation in RE development, as well as redis-
tributing the financial and political benefits of energy asset ownership, 
RECs have the potential to contribute to the democratization of RE ac-
cess and benefits. These dynamics have been addressed in academic 
literature by work on “energy democracy” (e.g. Szulecki (2018)). 
Although the deadline for the 27 Member States of the European 
Union to transpose the new rules of the RED II into national law was 
June 2021 it is expected that the process will last for the next few years. 
Against this background, this paper highlights the benefits and chal-
lenges of widespread development of RECs, and provides policy advice 
for effective implementation of the RED II in EU member states with 
respect to RECs. 
2. Renewable energy communities: definition and enabling 
framework 
In 2015, the European Commission issued two Communications: 
“Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers“ and “On a New Energy 
Market Design“ (European Commission, 2015a, 2015b). Their message 
was that the three pillars of future consumer energy policy would be 
consumer empowerment, smart homes and networks, and data man-
agement and protection. The Commission explicitly emphasised the role 
of prosumers (European Commission, 2015c) and thus advocated for 
both reducing energy costs through self-generation and consumption, 
and expanding the consumer’s role through intermediation and collec-
tive participation schemes. Consequently, when developing the new 
market design, the European Commission’s identified priorities were (1) 
(variable) RE promotion and deployment, (2) market integration and (3) 
putting consumers “at the centre of the future energy system” which 
includes making them self-consumers and (co-)owners (European 
Commission, 2015c). Here it should be recognized that the attractive-
ness of RE in general is assessed on the wholesale market, where 
renewables compete with other generation sources while the attrac-
tiveness of self-consumption depends on retail prices (Welsch, 2017); 
the challenge is thus how to frame a consistent policy to incorporate 
prosumers, be it individuals, municipalities or SMEs, as central actors 
linking RE with self-consumption. 
To qualify as a REC and benefit from the RED II “enabling frame-
work”, the new governance model of the RED II outlined in Table 1 must 
be met (not to be confused with the Energy Union Governance Regula-
tion adopted in 2018). A fundamental component of the new legislation 
is the “active consumer”, embracing both consumption and production 
of RE (i.e. “prosumership”). Pursuant to Articles 21 and 22 RED II, 
“renewable self-consumers” have the right to consume, sell or store RE 
generated on their premises (i.e. “prosumage” when prosumption in-
cludes storage). The new EU Clean Energy Package legal frame, along-
side individual basic energy rights of European citizens, also introduces 
the above rights for citizens collectively organised in energy commu-
nities with a separate and distinct legal personality, i.e., in RECs. 
Members of RECs have the privilege of sharing electricity, and other 
forms of energy, between members or shareholders, even when using the 
public grid. Key aspects to qualify as a REC include geographic prox-
imity of the members controlling the REC to the RE installations and the 
heterogeneity of members, whereby no single shareholder owns a con-
trolling stake. Geographic proximity of controlling members ensures 
that local stakeholders are beneficiaries, while the heterogeneity of 
members upholds the autonomy of the REC collective from individual 
members. 
Additional to the mentioned basic energy rights as prosumers, RECs 
benefit from a specific “enabling framework to promote and facilitate 
their development”. The RED II refrains from specifying the contents of 
this new “enabling framework” leaving the competence to define its 
content to the national legislators. However, the RED II sets three 
guiding implementation principles, namely (i) facilitating RECs 
competition on equal footing with large-scale players; (ii) taking into 
account specificities of RECs when designing support schemes; and (iii) 
providing public authorities with regulatory and capacity-building 
support and helping them to participate directly (see recital 71 and 
Art. 22 RED II (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2018). This provides clear direction to legislators on what they must do, 
but not how to best achieve the required outcomes. Yet, as the moti-
vation for community energy initiatives to qualify as a REC pursuant to 
RED II depends to a large extent on the attractiveness of the preferential 
conditions defined in the “enabling framework” we expect large differ-
ences across the EU 27. 
The new governance model (Table 1) has far reaching implications 
because the success of citizen-owned energy has, to date, depended upon 
variable support from national governments. While some jurisdictions 
have created conditions for REC diffusion, others have maintained 
regulatory or financial barriers to limit community energy expansion 
(Brisbois, 2020b; Burke and Stephens, 2018). The RED II REC 
Table 1 
The new governance model for energy communities under RED II (adapted from 
Lowitzsch et al. (2020)).  
Criteria Renewable Energy Communities pursuant to Art. 2 (16) RED II 
Eligibility ⋅ Natural persons, 
⋅ Small and medium sized enterprises, 
⋅ local authorities, incl. municipalities; 
Primary Purpose “Environmental, economic or social community benefits for its 
shareholders/members or for local areas where it operates, 
rather than financial profits”; 
Membership Voluntary participation open to all potential local members 
based on non-discriminatory criteria; 
Ownership and 
control 
⋅ Effectively controlled by shareholders or members that are 
located in the proximity of the RE projects that are owned and 
developed by the REC; 
⋅ Is autonomous (no individual shareholder may own more 
than 33% of the stock).  
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governance model is intended to ensure that the economic, social and 
environmental benefits of energy market participation are equitably 
available to EU citizens. 
RECs directly benefit from the "Just Transition Fund“ of the “Euro-
pean Green Deal” (European Commission, 2019a,b), explicitly geared 
towards smaller-scale RE projects (European Commission, 2020), as well 
as from the European Structural and Investment Funds (European 
Commission, 2014). However, when clarifying and transposing the 
“enabling framework” for RECs and the corresponding programs of the 
European Structural and Investment funds dedicated to RE projects, 
national and regional legislators need to respect the rules for admissible 
State Aid (European Commission, 2019a,b; Schön, 2016). To avoid 
conflicts with these rules, in analogy to the established principles for 
fiscal and tax incentives for cooperatives (European Commission, 2016), 
preferential treatment should be tied to the following requisites with 
respect to a REC’s local controlling shareholders or members: (a) the 
REC acts in their economic interest; (b) their relations are not purely 
commercial, but are linked to their local individual RE energy supply; (c) 
they are actively involved as prosumers in the local RE project; and, (d) 
they are entitled to equitable distribution of the results of economic 
performance. 
3. Focus: transposition concerns in relation to RECs 
RECs are specified in the RED II but are not the only possible form of 
energy communities as European energy law allows other private law 
initiatives (Jasiak, 2018). Instead of decreeing a uniform legal form for 
RECs, the European legislator has decided for an opt-in mechanism 
when adopting the new rules of RED II providing the possibility for 
community energy initiatives to qualify as RECs if they wish so. The 
result is a market-based approach where only communities finding the 
REC model useful will use it. Incumbents, usually defined as those with 
central roles in existing, centralised energy systems, may still set up their 
own energy “communities” to enable the technical benefits of distrib-
uted energy siting. However, to qualify as a REC and benefit from the 
“enabling framework” and the privilege of energy sharing, the gover-
nance model in Table 1 must be complied with. For incumbents, using 
this model will come at the price of control (i.e. not more than 33% 
ownership). More commercially-driven models that do not provide the 
benefits of democratic participation and decision-making, or a redistri-
bution of profits to retail investors, like limited partnerships or silent 
partnerships, thus compete with RECs. 
Confusion over the difference between RECs (Table 1) and other 
local or “community” energy models can lead to suboptimal policy 
outcomes that do not capture the range of benefits described above 
(Devine-Wright, 2019). The scale at which RECs are deployed in practice 
will depend upon (i) the attractiveness and coherence of the RED II 
“enabling framework”, and; (ii) the elasticity of the underlying business 
model to allow for the participation of, or cooperation with, professional 
actors from the energy sector. Policy makers should be clear about the 
differences between RECs and other types of energy communities to 
ensure policy coherence. 
The EC BRIDGE’s “REC task force” has outlined the wide variety of 
possible RECs and stressed the importance of REC function (e.g. gener-
ator, aggregator) and context (e.g. social, institutional) for the choice of 
both legal vehicle and financing sources involved (Hannoset et al., 
2019). In a similar manner, the Asset Study (Tounquet et al., 2020) 
stresses the interrelatedness between functional context and the busi-
ness/financing model of RECs. The flourishing movement of energy 
communities, many of which emerged long before the passing of the 
CEP, show a broad variety of patterns involving different combinations 
of (innovative) organizational and contractual arrangements, (local) 
identities and (common) interests depending, amongst other factors, on 
geography (Lowitzsch, 2019). The implementation of RECs is influenced 
by each of these factors but it is the combination of them in a particular 
setting that may be hindering or facilitating. The geographic, 
technological and cultural diversity of RE-projects, in combination with 
this interdependency, lead to complexities that preclude “one size fits 
all” solutions, even within a given country. However, while “identity”, 
“interest” and suitable technology are deeply rooted in geographies and 
cultures, there is elasticity in how organizational and contractual ar-
rangements are developed (Baigorrotegui and Lowitzsch, 2019). This is 
reflected in our guidance on potential financing and business models. 
To address the complexities of implementation, we discuss four key 
socio-technical issues important for policy makers responsible for 
transposing the new rules to consider: to (1) encourage RE “clusters” 
that support resource complementarity between RE amongst a range of 
actors to minimize costs and maximize benefits of RE integration; (2) 
consider relationships between the spatial distribution of RE potential, 
community density and demand, and demographics with the aim to 
maximize both social acceptance and investments in RECs; (3) anticipate 
input and pushback from incumbents to ensure effective implementa-
tion of new policies; (4) encourage inclusion of gender diversity, 
vulnerable consumers and low-income households to ensure a just, and 
socially accepted, energy transition. In our discussion of socio-technical 
issues, we recognise that individual Member States have their own 
complex path-dependent traditions of RE and social economy. 
Addressing these complexities requires developing financing and 
ownership models that reflect both the technical and the social requi-
sites while being sufficiently adaptable (Roby and Dibb, 2019). To 
illustrate this challenge, we subsequently compare two financing/-
business models that are consistent with the RED II governance model 
for RECs. As Member States are currently transposing and revising laws, 
and the revision process will continue beyond the June 2021 deadline, 
we provide relevant examples from first adopters. 
4. Key socio-technological issues for the transposition of RED II 
with regard to RECs 
The presentation in this section follows a common structure, that is, 
a) key definitions, b) benefits, c) challenges, d) experiences and e) policy 
recommendations. 
4.1. Address complementarity, heterogeneity and proximity 
simultaneously 
Complementarity, the asynchronicity of power production amongst 
RE, is an optimal technical and economic solution for the integration of 
RE onto the grid (Hoicka and Rowlands, 2011). Complementarity means 
using a variety of different variable RE at the same time to smooth out 
power production. Low power production from one source can be 
compensated by power production from other sources. Successful up-
take of RE requires technological innovation and interventions that, due 
to the nature of RE, depend upon space, time, contrast and 
complementarity. 
The many benefits of complementarity include improved grid sta-
bility (Xinshuo Zhang et al., 2018), increased network capacity to 
integrate variable renewable power (Sun and Harrison, 2019), and 
reduced system costs for energy storage (Ramirez Camargo et al., 
2019a). Prioritizing complementarity serves to decrease not only 
required RE generation capacity, but also the storage and backup re-
quirements. This holds for clusters scaled at residential levels (Ramirez 
Camargo et al., 2019a), for industrial consumers with a constant de-
mand (Ramirez Camargo et al., 2019b), and for entire countries 
(Schmidt et al., 2016). Further optimization can occur when energy 
systems address heat, cooling, transport and electricity demand jointly. 
For example, heat pumps that input electricity and output heat can be an 
optimal complement for electricity surplus from variable renewables, 
and they can be combined with district heating networks, or heat and 
power installations (Lund et al., 2014). 
The main technological challenge to the exploitation of these energy 
sources is that of balancing geographically-dispersed, intermittent RE 
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with demand. In terms of implementation, it is not yet clear how to 
encourage complementarity of RE by multiple actors in a RE cluster in 
policies that promote RE, including RED II. Although complementarity 
has been studied extensively with regards to energy system optimization 
and RE integration, there has been little to no analysis of policies that 
encourage complementarity (Haley, 2014). While there is an emerging 
literature on multi-actor grids and decentralization (Ghadi et al., 2019; 
Grosspietsch et al., 2019), there is limited knowledge about how to 
encourage multiple actors as prosumers and producers on a localized 
grid to provide complementary RE (Wolsink, 2012). Social science 
literature on decentralization recognises that social actors should be 
involved in decision making of shared, small scale RE systems. 
Furthermore, it promotes technical flexibility, but does not specifically 
address complementarity (e.g. Brisbois, 2020b). Despite the lack of 
research into enabling policy, legislators still need to consider how to 
build capacity for and incentivize complementarity among actors who 
produce and consume renewable power in a REC, in order to capture 
techno-economic benefits. 
The initial Italian transposition of REC rules of RED II (Italian Re-
public, 2019) highlights these issues. The current incentive design un-
intentionally hinders complementarity among RE and inhibits RE 
clusters. In Italy, legal entities established as RECs are limited by size 
and by date of entry into operation. The size limit of 200 kW of RE limits 
the combination of RE, for example the integration of wind power, and 
restricts heating systems (Borroni et al., 2020). By restricting projects to 
those entering into operation after March 1, 2020, potential RECs are 
inhibited from adding onto existing RE installations implemented prior 
to this timeframe. Furthermore, an incoherence in the incentive system 
puts existing energy communities with RE plants already in operation 
before March 2020 – according to the new regulation, these do not 
qualify as RECs – at a disadvantage vis-a-vis to RECs established after 
March 1, 2020. In practice, a new energy community that (also) includes 
older installations will lose various incentives provided over time for its 
individual members. In particular, photovoltaic systems in the form of 
on-site exchange (“scambio sul posto”, a net metering arrangement) will 
not have access to the new collective incentives provided for RECs. This 
may result in the RECs not including older installations that would 
complement the new RE plants. Although the rationale of the legislator 
to avoid cross subsidies is understandable, the Italian example demon-
strates the importance of specifically allowing for RE clusters that 
include complementarity and the benefits they confer. 
Sociotechnical innovation in RE can be implemented alongside RECs 
to maximize both grid and social benefits. RECs can be deployed with 
“RE clusters” (Fig. 1) that address the technical challenges to RE uptake 
(Lowitzsch et al., 2020). RE clusters are composed of bi-directional en-
ergy flows, interconnectivity amongst a range of actors on a system, 
elements of flexibility (e.g. storage, demand response), as well as 
complementarity of RE (Lowitzsch et al., 2020). The CEP encourages 
interconnectivity, bidirectionality and flexibility, but it does not 
explicitly encourage complementarity amongst RE. Support for inte-
grated spatial and energy planning at the local scale should help exploit 
complementarity between multiple sources and technologies (Ramirez 
Camargo and Stoeglehner, 2018) for RECs. 
4.2. Proximity and energy sharing 
Proximity of REC participants to a REC’s production installations 
affects their eligibility to be controlling shareholders as well as the type 
of RE availability in that specific geographic location. 
Proximity rules ensure that local stakeholders are beneficiaries of a 
REC but they also affect technical and spatial conditions for participa-
tion. Due to geography, RECs in urban areas can specifically benefit from 
their high energy demand density and the demographics of potential 
investing members. The aggregation of a high number of individual 
demands in a relatively small area enables the creation of efficient multi- 
carrier (i.e. heat, cooling and electricity) RE clusters that use waste heat 
capture and provide flexibility services, such as demand side manage-
ment. RECs in rural areas with low energy demand and with available 
Fig. 1. Possibilities for Renewable Energy Clusters (source: adapted from Lowitzsch et al. (2020)).  
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space for the installation of RE plants can become net energy producers. 
The EU is one of the most densely urbanized regions globally (UN 
Habitat, 2016), and urban areas house most of the opportunity for 
financing and investment compared to rural areas. This is important 
since consumer co-ownership of RE tends to be financed both by com-
munities of place – people bound together by their common location like 
a village or neighbourhood – and by communities of interest – people 
who might be geographically distant but who coalesce due to common 
energy interests (Baigorrotegui and Lowitzsch, 2019). Projects funded 
by communities of interest tend to adopt RE technologies that are chosen 
based on market or incentives, are grid connected, and often installed by 
international, large-scale companies and therefore standardized and 
scalable, i.e., mainly singular RE sources (Baigorrotegui and Lowitzsch, 
2019). Projects funded by communities of place tend to be off-grid or 
micro-grid, and tailor made to the local RE potential and energy needs 
(Baigorrotegui and Lowitzsch, 2019). 
Defining proximity too narrowly could disqualify urban or rural 
projects that spread over a large territory comprising various RE. Large 
single-sourced RE projects like a community-owned wind park may also 
require financial and organizational participation beyond a single mu-
nicipality (Creamer et al., 2018). In both cases, members too far away 
from individual RE installations would be excluded from the circle of 
controlling shareholders affecting both the heterogeneity criteria of 
membership and complementarity of RE. Furthermore, considering 
complementarity, both urban and rural projects involving more than 
one RE source will not necessarily be built close to each other due to 
planning law requirements and availability of suitable sites. For 
example, minimum distance rules for wind power means it will be far 
from roof-top solar. Under narrowly defined proximity, these projects 
could be disqualified as RECs, denied substantial funding as RECs, and 
deprived of the privilege of energy sharing, a requisite to tap the po-
tential of RE complementarity. A related problem concerns the condi-
tions under which electricity sharing within the REC should be allowed 
with regard to the grid architecture. 
Member States are already adopting different approaches to these 
challenges. For example, the Portuguese law 162/2019 of October 25, 
2019 (Portuguese Republic, 2019) explicitly calls for a case-to-case 
approach in assessment of proximity. The Austrian draft law 58-ME 
XXVII GP of September 16, 2020 (Republic of Austria, 2020) allows 
for the medium voltage grid as the upper limit while distinguishing grid 
fees depending on whether low (“Lokalbereich”) or medium voltage 
(“Regionalbereich”) is used. Some early laws, such as the cited Italian 
law from 2019, restrict electricity sharing to metering points on the 
same low voltage grid behind the same transformer station, presumably 
to address capacity concerns of grid operators. However, the result is to 
inadvertently prevent potential members of a REC from joining just 
because they are not located on the same lower voltage grid. In dense 
urban settings, two sides of the same street may be behind different 
transformers. In this way, the REC requirement of openness to all po-
tential local members based on non-discriminatory criteria and the 
principle of equality in European law are violated. 
Transposition of the proximity criterion for RECs requires careful 
calibration as it affects both heterogeneity of ownership (i.e., the num-
ber of potential financial investors (see Table 1)) as well as the RE cluster 
configuration (i.e., type of RE, complementarity, and use of the grid). 
Legislators should define the proximity criterion so as to ensure 
ownership and governance criteria are met, but also that RE cluster 
installation types are not unduly limited. At the same time, they must 
consider how to maintain the ability of REC members to share and/or 
sell electricity to each other. A flexible definition of proximity, 
depending on the spatial organization of a REC, can help to balance 
motivations with geographies of energy supply and demand, urbaniza-
tion trends, and demographics of investment, with heterogeneity of REC 
membership. The terms “proximity” and “local area” should be con-
textualised, adapting them to what is nationally and regionally 
appropriate. 
4.3. Powershifts - anticipate pushback from incumbents 
Political power is the ability of actors to have their interests realized 
in political settings. Those who dominate key economic sectors are often 
well placed to realize their political goals (Fuchs, 2007). Decentraliza-
tion has the potential to shift the balance of political power that shapes 
energy decision-making (Brisbois, 2020a). At present, electricity market 
ownership across the EU is largely centralised in the hands of a relatively 
small number of public or private generation companies. The shift in 
market ownership implicit in the RED II is both politically and 
economically significant. It will lead at least to some reorganisation of 
control over energy systems and associated financial benefits, and the 
political influence that comes from controlling societally essential re-
sources (Burke and Stephens, 2018). 
Successful implementation of the RED II will disrupt ownership 
patterns in energy markets. At least some fraction of market share will be 
distributed amongst large numbers of new REC members. We take the 
position that the anticipated changes in ownership structure imply 
greater social, environmental and economic good for all (Raworth, 
2017). While incumbents may seek the minimization of economic or 
political disruption, broader economic participation is crucial for the 
active engagement of the European citizenry (Lowitzsch, 2019). This 
perspective is supported by literature on “energy democracy” which 
extensively reviews the positive political impacts possible from an 
opening up of energy system ownership to a wider range of actors (see 
Szulecki (2018) and Burke and Stephens (2017)). There are already 
emergent examples of community ownership and prosumership creating 
the conditions for broader democratic engagement (e.g. Greenberg and 
McKendry (2021)). 
Many incumbent policy and regulatory actors now recognise the 
potential of an energy system characterised by a non-trivial contribution 
from RECs - as evidenced by the approval of the RED II at the EU level. 
However, they have concerns related to the technical and financial ca-
pacity of new actors, the infrastructure investment required to enable 
decentralization of the grid, equality of opportunity for citizen partici-
pation in RECs, and general provision of secure energy supplies (John-
son and Hall, 2014). Many incumbent commercial actors have, to date, 
actively opposed the diversification of electricity ownership because it 
will reduce profitability (Brisbois, 2020a; Hess, 2016; Lee and Hess, 
2019). However, these incumbent actors hold the technical and insti-
tutional knowledge required to ensure smooth functioning of the energy 
system. A key challenge for REC diffusion is thus that it requires coop-
eration between incumbent actors and new community interests. 
The ability of RECs themselves to defend their interests and engage 
politically is growing (Brisbois, 2020a). However, there is real potential 
for co-optation or perversion of the intent of the RED II by those with an 
interest in maintaining the political and economic status quo. Forms of 
local energy, owned and controlled by incumbents, can reap the tech-
nical benefits of decentralization but miss out on the myriad socioeco-
nomic benefits of community energy models. This would be a missed 
opportunity, and would jeopardize the success of the energy transition 
by hampering public acceptance (Devine-Wright, 2019). 
Political pushback against diversification of ownership can take 
many forms. It includes easily visible activities such as direct lobbying 
(Brisbois, 2020a), attempts to influence public opinion through the 
media (Lee and Hess, 2019; Rosenbloom et al., 2016), and legal chal-
lenges against enabling policies (Hess, 2016). The central role of 
incumbent companies in energy systems also means that they are able to 
influence the transposition of the RED II in ways that can be hidden or 
invisible. For example, influence over technical regulatory code panels 
can be used to set rules detrimental to RECs (e.g. Lockwood et al. 
(2017)). Control over data on grid capacity has also been used to limit 
both RE and REC penetration by claiming grid constraints where there 
are later shown to be none (Stokes, 2013). Policy makers seeking to reap 
the benefits of RECs will need to proactively develop plans that support 
and defend these initiatives. 
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While there is a threat of co-optation by vested interests, restricting 
design options for legal and financing models to prevent abuse of RECs 
by incumbents may also hinder their implementation on a broader scale. 
For example, the Greek law on Energy Communities from early 2018 
(Hellenic Republic, 2018) is one of the first codifications of REC, which 
was passed before the RED II. Anticipating the new RED II rules for 
RECs, the Greek legislation limits the legal form of qualified RECs to that 
of cooperatives (REScoop and ClientEarth, 2020). This narrow approach 
rules out other types of legal forms, which limits the variety and reach of 
RECs. 
To ensure the intent of RED II is preserved, it will be important for 
policy makers to commit to technical, political and institutional capacity 
building for REC members (Berka and Creamer, 2018). Actors should 
also be empowered to participate in local energy planning processes to 
help enable complementarity of RE in and amongst RECs. To ensure a 
level playing field for RECs, there is a need for enforcement of disclosure 
rules to ensure open, transparent and accessible technical data from 
operators who may make arguments that this data is proprietary (Bris-
bois, 2020b; Stokes, 2013). The RED II opens up new energy governance 
dynamics as it is inclusive of the wider range of energy actors. It may be 
helpful for policy makers to begin to think of energy systems as 
multi-level and increasingly participatory. This will enable policy ap-
proaches that clearly allocate roles and responsibilities, and sufficient 
funding (Gastil and Richards, 2013), considering the capacities of 
different actors. It may also be appropriate to consider direct democratic 
mechanisms like citizens’ assemblies that attempt to compensate for 
political power imbalances when making important system decisions (e. 
g. grid modifications, creation of regional energy system coordination 
bodies) (Ferejohn, 2008; Gastil and Richards, 2013; MacArthur, 2016). 
Finally, as the Greek example demonstrates, transposition is a bal-
ance between ensuring democratic mechanisms and principles, and 
allowing sufficient elasticity with regard to the form of REC incorpora-
tion. Therefore, national legislators should take into account the func-
tional context of RE projects and reward their social and local benefits by 
targeted incentives in the enabling framework. 
4.4. Energy justice - design for inclusion 
Community energy projects are often presented as a strategy for 
tackling energy poverty - understood as inadequate levels of access to 
essential services like heating and lighting (Bomberg and McEwen, 
2012). They are also viewed as one possible vehicle for pursuing energy 
justice, or providing “… all individuals, across all areas, with safe, 
afford-able and sustainable energy” (McCauley et al., 2013). 
The RED II rules regarding prosumership are consistent with prin-
ciples of energy justice and, if effectively transposed and taken up, 
should contribute to improved justice outcomes. The RED II states that 
RECs should be “open to all potential local members based on non- 
discriminatory criteria”. At the same time, failing to simultaneously 
address energy justice issues can erode public confidence and reduce 
support for the energy transition (MacArthur, 2016; Wyse and Hoicka, 
2019). 
REC projects may not equally progress benefits or participation for 
everyone (Creamer et al., 2018), even with the careful definition of RECs 
in RED II. Outcomes depend on who plans and executes RECs, and how 
they do it (Berka and Creamer, 2018). Ignoring justice concerns can 
aggravate poverty and non-participation, entrench gender biases (Jen-
kins, 2019), and thus fail to optimize the projected social and economic 
benefits from RECs. Impoverished households should be enabled to 
participate in and benefit from projects, rather than only those with 
higher socio-economic status. Prosumership, an important component of 
RECs, requires access to financing, know-how, and a certain willingness 
to take risks. At the same time legislation on social welfare transfers 
require social benefit recipients to have no access to asset ownership or 
income (Lowitzsch and Hanke, 2019a), prohibiting their participation in 
(co-)ownership of RE installations. 
Those with poor housing conditions and irregular employment 
already struggle with changes in domestic energy infrastructure, such as 
energy efficiency refurbishments (Buzar, 2007). More changes in the 
regulatory frameworks and uncertain future benefits may also 
discourage participation (Devine-Wright, 2019). For these reasons, 
legislators should distribute prosumption benefits equally across social 
groups. This will facilitate social acceptance and political support for the 
transition itself (Fuller, 2017; Middlemiss and Parrish, 2010). 
Socio-cultural aspects of gender and race mediate access to REC benefits 
(Kumar, 2018; Petrova and Simcock, 2019). The average 16% gender 
pay gap (Eurostat, 2019) in the EU means that women have less income 
to invest as capital in RECs. Across Europe, women have invested less in 
and own smaller shares of RE cooperatives than men (Fraune, 2015; 
Lapniewska, 2019). Energy poverty is shown to exacerbate existing 
gender inequalities. RECs, despite existing demographic trends, offer 
opportunities for empowerment and the reconfiguration of existing 
gender relations (Petrova and Simcock, 2019). 
An example of an innovative inclusive approach for the transposition 
of RED II is the French law on energy and climate of November 2019 
(French Republic, 2019). In addition to defining the compliance criteria 
for RECs, it also defines by law the legal entity implementing a social 
housing project as a potential REC. The law also defines the residents of 
these buildings as REC members by default. In this way, the French 
legislator has implemented an opt-out model for social housing RECs 
that accelerate participation of the residents. It remains unclear to what 
extent the new members also share in the ownership of the REC. The 
idea to link RECs to housing projects is also taken up by the Austrian 
legislator in the September 2020 draft law (Republic of Austria, 2020) 
that explicitly acknowledges co-owner associations according to the 
2002 Condominium Act as vehicles for RECs. 
The capacity of marginalized communities must be addressed 
directly by participatory and public engagement activities (Smith et al., 
2016; Wyse and Hoicka, 2019), and in policy development. Rather than 
a one-size-fits-all plan, RED II policy mechanisms should be flexible 
enough to respond to the socio-economic capabilities and needs of 
different communities, including potential risks and opportunities and 
how they can be respectively mitigated and enhanced. To specifically 
address this, ancillary rules should accompany the transposition of RED 
II. For example: (a) provide target incentives for RECs that effectively 
include vulnerable groups; (b) exempting investments in RECs from the 
necessity to liquidate one’s assets when applying for means-tested social 
transfers; (c) allowing direct energy subsidies for vulnerable consumers 
to be capitalised as a lump sum to join an existing or set up a new REC 
(Hanke and Lowitzsch, 2020). 
5. Financing and ownership models 
Accommodating the above socio-technical considerations requires 
appropriate business models. The appropriateness of any given REC 
business model depends on context. This includes the socioeconomic 
and demographic profile of the participating community, the over-
arching governing and legal frame, capacities, and the physical resource 
potential. Business models for RECs require (i) sufficient elasticity to 
include different types of co-investors; (ii) allowance for a fair division 
of responsibilities and benefits between them; and (iii) respect for RED II 
governance requirements. 
This section compares two business models that - in contrast to that, 
e.g., of limited partnerships - are consistent with the governance re-
quirements for RECs in the RED II (summarised in Table 2), and that will 
allow RECs to fulfil their technical and socioeconomic potential: The co- 
operative model (prevalent across existing RECs and therefore discussed 
in less detail), and the Consumer Stock Ownership Plan (CSOP), a 
business model specifically intended to support engagement of low- 
income households in joint ventures. 
The co-operative model has been very successful across Europe for 
the development and diffusion of small-scale RECs. The model is defined 
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by the co-operative principle of ‘one member, one vote’ regardless of the 
number of shares held. Compensation for co-operative managers is 
usually capped, and profits from operations are allocated under agreed- 
upon terms. Co-operatives pursue economic or social community ben-
efits for their members and contribute to the development of their 
communities by sourcing and investing locally. They can give equal or 
greater priority to social or environmental outcomes, if they so choose. 
In contrast, the main objective of business corporations is profit for their 
shareholders. Co-operatives therefore have more leeway in defining 
operational priorities. 
Co-operative models present some challenges. They often rely on a 
significant amount of volunteer labour from members. This can result in 
capacity and stability challenges (Tarhan, 2020). They also tend to be 
risk-averse, limiting participation in larger-scale projects which may 
have overarching benefits (Herbes et al., 2017). With respect to the 
heterogeneity of co-investors in RECs, for example, when co-operatives 
partner with municipalities, the necessity of representation of their of-
ficials on management and supervisory bodies has been reported as an 
obstacle (Lowitzsch and Hanke, 2019b). This is because all members of 
cooperatives are elected by and from the members’ general assembly 
and cooperative law generally does not acknowledge a right of delega-
tion. Co-operatives also require upfront capital for membership. This is a 
barrier for lower income segments of society and means that the benefits 
of REC participation are predominantly experienced by already privi-
leged segments of society (Yildiz et al., 2015), and are not gender diverse 
(Fraune, 2015; Lapniewska, 2019). 
There remains a need for business models that guarantee open entry 
to RECs, including for low-income households and consumers threat-
ened by energy poverty as postulated by the legislator (compare Art. 22 
para 4 (f) RED II), while ensuring representation of municipalities or 
other co-investors like SMEs on supervisory bodies. The Consumer Stock 
Ownership Plan (CSOP), facilitates entry of those without capital, time 
or expertise (Lowitzsch, 2019). A CSOP (Fig. 2) is a business model that 
employs an intermediary operating company and facilitates the 
involvement of individual consumers as investors through a trusteeship. 
The trustee is an independent fiduciary (a physical person or a corporate 
entity which may also be in turn a cooperative) installed, in the case of 
RECs, by the local community. The trustee represents the 
consumer-beneficiaries. 
CSOPs are particularly suited to situations where citizens lack 
upfront capital. The CSOP can buy into existing installations, or invest in 
new RE plants and may use external financing, thereby achieving the 
benefit of financial leverage. To address the lack of access to capital, the 
operating company is authorized to borrow funds for the acquisition of 
shares in the RE plant on behalf of the energy consumers. Revenues from 
the sale of the energy produced are used to repay the acquisition loan 
assumed by the CSOP. Once this debt is amortized, revenue is distrib-
uted to the consumer-beneficiaries. In this way, citizens with low in-
come are enabled to repay their share of the acquisition loan from the 
future earnings of the investment. 
Since the operating company is usually a privately held corporation 
with limited liability, CSOPs are also attractive for (local) commercial 
investors. Different than cooperatives, voting rights are proportional to 
shareholding. The REC governance model, required by RED II, is already 
enshrined in the statutes of the operating company. This means that 
there are 33% and 51% shareholding limits to ensure that no one actor is 
able to control a disproportionate amount of decision-making power. It 
also means there are restricted rules for sale between shareholders, or to 
outsiders. 
The two-tier level of rule setting “corporate statutes - fiduciary 
agreement” makes it possible to include objectives unusual to the 
corporate world. For example, the company statutes can contain stipu-
lations on board composition (such as gender or income diversity), or on 
financial assistance for acquisition of shares to specific groups. The in-
dividual fiduciary agreements may contain gender-oriented rules for 
sale. This is an important lever as there are arguments for gender di-
versity in leadership in the renewable energy sector to bring about both 
energy democracy and energy justice (Allen et al., 2019; MacArthur 
et al., 2020), as well as organizational effectiveness (Pearl-Martinez and 
Stephens, 2016). 
The trusteeship is designed to protect the interests of consumer 
shareholders while rendering co-investments attractive to other part-
ners. Representation by a trustee makes the consumers’ voting behav-
iour predictable while still ensuring meaningful participation in 
decision-making. The fiduciary agreement, negotiated at CSOP incep-
tion, defines which decisions are retained by the consumer shareholders, 
and which are delegated to the trustee. It also defines the rights and 
obligations of the consumer beneficiaries. As a rule, decision-making for 
day-to-day tasks is left to the trustee jointly with the other shareholders 
of the REC. This provides stability because it ensures that consumer 
shareholder participation does not affect the management of routine, 
day-to-day operations. Strategic decisions are voted amongst the con-
sumer shareholders. These votes are then represented via the trustee on 
the board of the operating company. Benefitting from a stronger position 
relative to the other municipal or corporate co-owners in the CSOP, the 
consumers can avoid fragmentation of their voting rights. 
The compatibility of the CSOP model with municipal and more 
commercially-oriented investments comes at the price of moving away 
from the one-member-one-vote principle of cooperatives and accepting 
Table 2 
Comparison of consumer ownership models with regard to the RED II aims.   
Cooperative Trusteed scheme 
like e.g., CSOP 
Limited 
Partnership 
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projects; lead by 
cooperative 
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projects 
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voting rights proportional to shareholding (see comparison in Table 2). 
However, as a trusteed scheme, the CSOP compensates this possible 
imbalance by ensuring that consumer shareholding is consolidated and 
that local shareholders will effectively control the RECs. A downside of 
the CSOP are the additional costs associated with the trusteeship which, 
nevertheless, can be offset to some extent by reduced transaction costs. 
However, CSOPs are not suited for small projects and require a mini-
mum size to justify the two-tier decision-making process. 
Last but not least, the possibility of involvement of professional ac-
tors from the existing energy sector ensures that required expertise and 
experience is available to allow the REC to implement the more complex 
elements of RE clusters. This concerns the balancing of responsibility, 
flexibility options and storage when various RE are involved. The ca-
pacity of a REC to become an aggregator and/or to engage in demand 
side management, and scale the projects, are all important to profit-
ability and improving the economic feasibility of RECs. This is because 
the reduction of load peak demand can be rewarded with reductions for 
grid fees but requires a certain minimum size (see e.g., in Germany 
paragraph 14a of the Electricity and Gas Supply Act (Federal Republic of 
Germany, 2020). Allowing for maximum heterogeneity of co-investors - 
not a priori excluding the incumbents - can therefore also encourage 
complementarity between RE. 
6. Conclusion 
Different Member States pursue different priorities when transposing 
the RED II, in particular with a view to the anticipated role of RECs in the 
Energy Transition. Therefore, while the RED II (and the IEMD) provide a 
common framework, it is already clear from the current transposition 
process that the rules for RECs differ to a wide extent depending on 
geographic, cultural, economic and political factors across the EU. We 
have argued that there are a number of general issues to be considered in 
every Member State that would support the scale-up of RECs. Reviewing 
academic literature on socio-technical factors, we discuss how 
geographic dispersion, and temporal variability of RE potential, push-
back from incumbents, and problems of representation and inclusion in 
community energy projects will affect successful transposition of RED II. 
Policies will ideally build upon the coupling of technological solutions 
with attention to social and political factors, based on sound analysis 
and knowledge of engineering, spatial planning, and social science. 
These settings and factors need to be reflected in the business and 
financing models, which can be considered a more flexible element of 
the process, because they are less determined by geography. To illustrate 
this, we reviewed two examples of business and financing models, 
namely co-operatives and CSOPs, that allow participation in RECs in 
different contexts. 
In summary, while the current RED II goes some way toward sup-
porting all of the issues discussed, more specificity is required. In light of 
the diversity of the 27 EU Member States, taking into account the path 
dependency of sociotechnical settings, one-size-fits-all approaches are 
not the solution. Although exchange of best practice between national 
legislators is needed, it should be stressed that applicability at the na-
tional level to a large extent depends on regional priorities. For example, 
Central Eastern European countries that focus on municipal-led RE 
cluster projects that are also meant to contribute to the renewal of 
outdated energy infrastructure have different needs from countries with 
a strong grassroots RE cooperative movement like Germany or Italy. 
Organizational and contractual arrangements must be designed appro-
priately, to provide elasticity outlined to the business models, as out-
lined here. While co-operatives have been the most frequent legal form 
for energy communities to date, the CSOP model has been highlighted as 
an alternative for situations where upfront capital is limited, member-
ship is heterogeneous, and citizen members are in the minority and need 
advice to ensure representation vis-a-vis other institutional shareholders 
(e.g. SMEs and municipalities). CSOPs are also useful where projects are 
designed to be scalable. 
The transposition examples from Austria, Greece, Italy and France 
exemplify the broad range of possibilities and limitations of imple-
mentation by national legislators. As transposition continues, we 
recommend exchange of best practice between Member States on the 
elements we have highlighted above. This is vital to tailor the “enabling 
framework” to the most suited (regional) business models, while 
meeting the challenges of ensuring efficient and complementary 
installation of RE clusters. 
In conclusion, as key aspects of our policy advice, we propose that 
rules are transposed:  
- To encourage complementarity amongst RE sources in particular 
via specific incentives as part of the “enabling framework”. Prereq-
uisite is to encourage multiple actors as prosumers and producers on 
a localized grid; this in turn requires additional efforts and thus 
Fig. 2. Structure of a Consumer Stock Ownership Plan as a legal form for RECs.  
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additional incentives that need to be harmonised with existing ones; 
furthermore, capacity limits should be avoided.  
- To contextualise the interpretation of “local” and “proximity” in 
such a way as to account for complementary of generation potentials 
and consumption requirements in urban versus rural areas. Legisla-
tors are confronted with the challenge to strike the balance between 
simplified rules that are easy to apply and tailored solutions that 
require additional administrative and time effort; a way out of this 
dilemma could be standard rules with the possibility to apply for 
exemptions if certain criteria are met. 
- To specifically support energy/electricity sharing as a new op-
tion for RECs that supports complementarity of load profiles and RE 
with equitable and fair rules concerning, e.g., grid fees. Here in 
particular restricting electricity sharing to the low voltage grid is a 
trap to avoid as it would arbitrarily set who can join a REC and thus 
conflict with the principle of “openness of membership” for RECs and 
more generally that of equality in European law.  
- To ensure that incumbents are enticed to cooperate with RECs, 
but without allowing them to co-opt the intent of diversified 
ownership. Therefore, national legislators should keep the legal 
framework flexible with regard to the eligible legal vehicles while 
taking into account the challenge that the heterogeneity of co- 
investors of RECs poses. At the same time the participation of in-
cumbents as minority stake co-investors should be facilitated, for 
example, via CSOPs.  
- To ensure that business models and policy designs allow for the 
full participation of disadvantaged and vulnerable commu-
nities. Ancillary rules to the RED II should provide target incentives 
for RECs that effectively include vulnerable groups; at the same time 
vulnerable consumers should be supported directly, for example, by 
exempting investments in RECs from the means-test for social 
transfers and/or allowing direct energy subsidies for vulnerable 
consumers to be capitalised as a lump sum to join an existing or set 
up a new REC. 
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(Energiewirtschaftsgesetz - EnWG). 
Ferejohn, J., 2008. Conclusion: the citizens’ assembly model. In: Warren, M.E., Pearse, H. 
(Eds.), Designing Deliberative Democracy: the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.1017/ 
CBO9780511491177.  
Fraune, C., 2015. Gender matters: women, renewable energy, and citizen participation in 
Germany. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 7, 55–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
erss.2015.02.005. 
French, Republic, 2019. LOI n◦ 2019-1147 du 8 novembre 2019 relative à l’énergie et au 
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